Exploring escalation of commitment in construction project management: Case study of the Scottish parliament project by Ahiaga-Dagbui, Dominic & Smith, Simon
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exploring escalation of commitment in construction project
management: Case study of the Scottish parliament project
Citation for published version:
Ahiaga-Dagbui, D & Smith, S 2014, Exploring escalation of commitment in construction project
management: Case study of the Scottish parliament project. in Procs 30th Annual ARCOM Conference. pp.
753-762, 30th Annual ARCOM Conference, Portsmouth, United Kingdom, 1/09/14.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Procs 30th Annual ARCOM Conference
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Ahiaga-Dagbui, D D and Smith S D (2014) Exploring escalation of commitment in construction project 
management: Case study of the scottish parliament project  In: Raiden, A B and Aboagye-Nimo, E 
(Eds) Procs 30th Annual ARCOM Conference, 1-3 September 2014, Portsmouth, UK, Association of 
Researchers in Construction Management, 753-762. 
EXPLORING ESCALATION OF COMMITMENT IN 
CONSTRUCTION PROJECT MANAGEMENT: CASE 
STUDY OF THE SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT PROJECT 
Dominic D Ahiaga-Dagbui1 and Simon D Smith 
School of Engineering, University of Edinburgh, EH9 3JL, Scotland, UK 
Successfully managing large construction projects within defined budget and time 
constraints has always been a major challenge largely because crucial decisions about 
the project's ultimate fate have to be made within an environment of significant 
uncertainty at the beginning of the project. It is not surprising that cost and time 
overruns are commonplace on construction projects. Existing literature often suggests 
economical, technical, political or managerial roots to this phenomenon. A less 
explored possible cause within construction management framework is the escalation 
of commitment to a course of action. This theory, grounded in social psychology and 
organisation behaviour, suggests the tendency of people and organisations to become 
'locked-in' and 'entrapped' in a particular course of action and thereby 'throw good 
money after bad' to make the venture succeed. This defies conventional rationality 
behind subjective expected utility theory. Through a critical analysis of the literature, 
we identify different frequently cited enablers of escalation of commitment.  Using a 
hindsight constructivist approach, we then demonstrate references to some of these 
enablers on the Scottish Parliament project. We found strong evidence in support of 
possible strategic misrepresentation, confirmation bias, self-justification and 
optimism bias. We highlight the importance of setting realistic time and budget 
constraints to circumvent escalation and make several recommendations to attenuate 
unwarranted escalation of commitment, including the use of  an objective outsider to 
evaluate responses to disconfirming information and the structuring of incentive 
systems that do not punish for inconsistency in order to curb the effects of  self-
justification and reputation management.  
Keywords: cost overruns, confirmation bias, escalation of commitment, self-
justification, strategic misrepresentation. 
INTRODUCTION 
Literature in social psychology and organisational behaviour suggests that after 
investing time, money, energy and other resources in a chosen course of action, 
individuals and decision makers often become "locked-in" or "entrapped" in that 
course of action, sometimes even if the venture is failing. Staw's (1976, 1981) seminal 
work on escalation of commitment seeks to explain why decision makers sometimes 
embark on a questionable course of action and then persist with them above and 
beyond what the objective facts suggest. The thesis of his work suggests that negative 
feedback on a previous decision often tends to rouse the feeling of self-justification 
and regret of that particular decision, thereby resulting in a reinforcement of additional 
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resources (money, time or effort)  to try and make the course of action pay off. 
Consider the following situations:  
1. A representative of an equity firm makes a decision to invest £5 million in a new IT
start-up that is expected to take about 3 years to develop and implement. It emerges
after two years that the IT firm is having liquidity issues and that the product might
require additional funds of £2.5 million and a year's extension. The equity firm must
decide whether to write-off the initial £5 million investment or commit the additional
funds to give the project a chance of success. Should they cut their losses now, risk
losing a total £7.5 million, or stake their chance at gaining much more should the
project eventually succeed?
2. A Government proposes an grand project that will represent the essence and ideals of
a people and be a symbol of devolution and national distinctiveness  at £40 million.
Two years later, it becomes obvious that it is impossible to complete the project at
that cost and a new estimate was set at £119 million, with legislators imposing a cap
of £195 million in the third year. By the 4th year, cost had increased to £241 million,
rising twice in the 5th year to £295 million amidst several controversies. By the 6th
year the cost reaches £376 million before project completion at £431 million in the
7th year.
Although each of the cases above presents different decision making situations, they 
both have a common trait - sequential decision patterns with one decision being made 
based on a previous. In each case also, a considerable amount of time, money and 
effort has already been committed to the venture and the results do not seem to be 
going as initially intended. Arkes and Blumer (1985) suggested that investment of 
resources often sets in motion non-rational sequential decision making process, with 
one form of commitment begetting further commitment. They further suggest that the 
more responsibility a person has for the outcome of an initial decision, the greater is 
the inertia towards further commitment. This tendency however, as noted by 
Bazerman and Moore (2008) defies the conventional rationality behind subjective 
expected utility theory which suggests that sunk costs or past losses should not enter 
into decisions regarding future gain (Bazerman and Moore 2008). 
Using the theoretical framework described in the discourse above, this paper will 
explore the sources of escalation of commitment using the case study of the Scottish 
Parliament project. We examine official government publications and documentary 
evidence from the public enquiry that followed the controversies surrounding the 
project using a hindsight constructivist research approach. We focus on the events 
before and during the construction that created an environment for escalation and how 
these possibly led to the inevitable cost and duration overrun on the project. The next 
section of the paper explores the theory of escalation more closely, before we examine 
the Holyrood project for evidence of the locked-in syndrome. We then reveal some 
lessons learnt from the case study for construction project management with 
recommendations on how to attenuate unwarranted escalation tendencies. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: ESCALATION OF 
COMMITMENT 
Decision making experiments have provided a lot of evidence that individuals have a 
systematic bias towards escalation of commitment. Some of the reasons provided 
include a failure to treat previous investments as sunk cost (Arkes and Blumer 1985), 
self-justification (Staw 1981) and anticipated regret (Sarangee et al. 2013). Kahneman 
(1994) suggests that some decision makers use escalation of investments as 
opportunity to redeem a previous sub-optimal choice whiles Brockner (1992) posits 
that escalation tendencies may be buoyed by personal responsibility for negative 
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consequences. Traditional economic decision making models suggest that people are 
rational and would make decisions in an attempt to maximise expected utility. Sunk 
costs (past investments) must essentially therefore be considered as historical and 
irrecoverable, thus should not be considered in decisions regarding future course of 
action (Bazerman and Moore 2008). However, Barnes' (1984) work supports the 
supposition that decision making is often biased in favour of retrospective rationality- 
the sunk cost effect.  
Organisations also demonstrate escalation tendencies, albeit in a more complex 
manner, according to Guler (2007). The presence of multiple members for decision 
making in organisations normally should increase the likelihood of recognising the 
irrationality of escalating commitment to a failing course of action. Bazerman et al 
(1984) thus found that groups are less likely than individuals to escalate commitment. 
They however added that where groups do escalate, they tend to do so to a greater 
degree than individuals, possibly because group dynamics tends to increase the level 
of justification to continue to support an initial venture.  We refer to this here as the 
strength in numbers effect. 
A tale of two schools 
There are essentially two schools of thought on escalation phenomenon. Decision 
error theorists, after Staw (1976), maintain that escalation is a result of a systematic 
bias in decision making where people, especially those that have personal 
responsibility for the outcome of the project or have a vested interest in the project, 
interpret feedback to support their point of view (Caldwell and O'Reilly 1982). 
According to Nickerson (1998), this can either be intentional or that the decision 
maker unknowingly falls to the curse of a confirmation bias - the seeking and  
interpretation of feedback in ways that are partial to existing beliefs or expectations. 
Decision dilemma theorists, after Bowen (1987), however point to uncertainty of 
information  and argue that feedback is often equivocal and that it is impossible to 
accurately predict how any venture will eventually turn out. Hantula and DeNicolis 
Bragger (1999) posit that these uncertainties could explain why it may be a prudent, at 
least at the time of making the decision, to continue to give the project a chance. 
Whether the project eventually fails or succeed is not necessarily a result of one wrong 
decision to rectify a previous sub-optimal choice, but simply a decision made amongst 
many alternatives in an environment of uncertainty.  
Sequential investment and escalation  
Sequential investment projects are particular susceptible to escalation tendencies 
because the venture does not generate intermediate financial payoffs until its 
complete. There is also some level of uncertainty over the amount and timing of the 
investment that will be required over the life of the project. Each investment stage 
therefore presents more opportunity cost as well as a milestone to either escalate 
commitment or pursue an alternative course of action. As found by Shepherd and 
Cardon (2009) however, terminating unsuccessful projects often comes with negative 
attending consequences including loss of job or losing face within an organisation. 
Decision makers often thus attempt to keep projects running by using end-gaming and 
using future-perfect strategies (Clegg et al. 2006). Strategic misrepresentation, the 
deliberate distortion or misstatement of  the amount of time or resources necessary to 
complete the venture is not an uncommon tactic either (see Jones and Euske 1991).  
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Table 1 summarises some of the factors that create an environment that enabling 
escalation of commitment. These factors will be expanded upon in latter sections of 
the paper with supporting evidence from the Holyrood Project.  
Table 1: Escalation enablers 
Construction projects normally involve a series of sequential decisions before actual 
construction begins. Most projects will go through long feasibility and gestation 
periods before project approval and eventual delivery. These phases involve an 
iterative process of information acquisition and incremental commitment over a period 
of time, presenting a conducive environment for escalation of commitment. Where a 
project has commercial interest and is subject to sequential investment, the project 
often tends to be perceived as an end in itself according to Winch (2013), and 
therefore must be completed, no matter what, in order to recoup any initial 
investments.  
RESEARCH APPROACH 
Winch (2013) explored the three-pronged effects of future perfect strategising, 
strategic misrepresentation and escalation of commitment on the Channel Fixed Link 
project in an attempt to develop a broader organisational perspective on cost 
escalation in major projects. He proposed a hindsight constructivist or historical 
approach as research method to help fully comprehend the organisational complexities 
that led to overruns. Winch suggests that this approach will help comprehend the 
idiosyncratic embeddedness of major construction. We adopt a similar approach in 
this paper as it best helps for sense-making of the political and social construct of our 
case study, the Scottish Parliament building (Holyrood Project). We explore escalation 
of commitment using official documentary evidence from the government 
commissioned public enquiry that followed the controversies surrounding the 
construction of the Holyrood project (Fraser 2004). We also examine the Auditor 
General's reports (2000, 2004) and the Spencely Report (2000) submitted to the 
Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body.  
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CASE STUDY: HOLYROOD PROJECT 
Completed 3 years late in 2004, at a cost of £431million, The Holyrood Building in 
Edinburgh houses the Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Its final cost is 
approximately ten times more than the headline final cost of £40million announced in 
the Government's devolution White Paper, Scotland's Parliament (1997). The 
Government commissioned the Spencely Report (2000) to investigate cost and time 
overruns on the project. This was followed by two major probes by the Auditor 
General (2000, 2004) before the defining public enquiry, chaired by Lord Fraser of 
Carmyllie (2004) after project hand-over to investigate key decisions undertaken 
throughout the project delivery. There were 66 witnesses and more than 13,000 
documents examined for the Public Enquiry (PE) alone. A full transcript of the 
transactions at the enquiry can be found at www.holyroodinquiry.org. These reports, 
as well as minutes of parliamentary proceedings, provide a rich source of 
documentary evidence to support the empirical analysis conducted in this paper.  
The Act of Union of 1707 merged the Parliaments of Scotland and England into the 
Parliament of Great Britain, housed in the Palace of Westminster in London. Scotland 
was now effectively directly governed from London as a result (Colley 1992). 
However, in September 1997, the people of Scotland voted "Yes" in a referendum that 
would see the creation of the first Scottish Parliament in almost 300 years. Donald 
Dewer was appointed Secretary of State with the mandate to oversee the construction 
of a the parliament house. He became the main project champion, a key player and 
driver of what was to represent Scottish identity and aspirations. But the euphoria 
surrounding the referendum at this time led to many ill-considered decisions that 
created a conducive environment for escalation.  
Optimism bias 
First was the unrealistic cost ceiling of £40million. This turned out to be a rather 
optimistic estimate, or better still, a guesstimate of final cost of the project by non-
construction professionals. Recall that a central theme of escalation theory is the 
increase in resources devoted to a venture in an attempt to redeem a previous sub-
optimal choice. A member of the Scottish Parliament Corporate Body, Andrew Welsh 
MSP, stated that "right from the very start, the budgets were totally unrealistic. The 
original budgets we inherited were for a fictional building" [11 February 2004]. 
Rusell Hillhouse, former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Scottish Office and a 
member of the team that estimated the cost of the project at £40million said "we 
couldn't possibly have done a thorough job, and this was very difficult because it was 
a time when people were working extremely hard on other aspects of the White 
Paper" [PE 30th October 2003]2. Sam Galbraith, former Under-Secretary of State at 
the Scottish Office also told the public enquiry, "the figure of £40million in the white 
document, was never for Holyrood. That was for a bog-standard building on a 
greenfield site." [PE 28 October 2003 ]. When asked how he knew the figure was not 
for Holyrood project, he responded "That's what Donald [Dewer] told me" suggesting 
that the project champion at this stage may have been aware that the cost of the project 
announced to the public was unrealistic.  
Self-justification, Reputation management and Norms of Consistency 
Another sub-optimal decision that was made at the beginning of the project was the 
unrealistic completion date imposed on the project. Speed to build was priority for the 
project promoters who wanted the project completed within two years. This was 
2 Abbreviations: PE- Public Enquiry; MS/SE - Documentary evidences submitted to the public enquiry 
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strongly criticised by  the opposition leaders. In a letter to all MSPs, Donald Gorrie 
MSP criticised the decision of the Scottish Office and the Secretary of State, Donald 
Dewer, writing "There is no need for this haste...There has been widespread informed 
criticism of the fast timetable, for which there is no need. Professionals and 
organisations favouring the Holyrood site, favour a delay while the plans, timescale 
and budget are revised" [MS/16/042 - 043]. Alex Salmond MSP also insisted that 
there was no need to try and deliver the project within such a short duration. He wrote 
to Donald Dewer, "...it is quite impossible to have any new debating chamber of 
quality... ready by the time of the elections to the Scottish Parliament in 1999" 
[MS/1/071 – 079]. Ignoring these warnings, however, the project sponsors still 
proceeded with the 2 year duration.  
At least three enablers of escalation might have been at play at this stage - political 
reputation management, self-justification and maintaining norms of consistency. 
Negative feedback on a past decisions calls the validity of the original decision into 
question and is dissonant with a decision maker’s natural desire to see himself as 
competent. Many decision makers would often escalate commitment to their previous 
decision in order to prove that the initial decision was valid. In the case of the 
promoters of the Holyrood project, choosing a fast tract delivery method suddenly 
became very appealing if they had to meet 2 year deadline. Construction management 
procurement method was thus chosen as it has the advantage of allowing both design 
and project construction to occur concurrently. Using conventional construction 
methods of design before building would have added an extra 18months to the 
duration, according to William Armstrong, the Project Manager [PE 3 December 
2003]. However, using construction management may well have been the single most 
important decision that was largely responsible for the cost and time overrun 
experienced on the Holyrood project. The client bears all financial risks associated 
with delays and design changes and final cost of the project could not be realistically 
known until all designs were completed. In addition, there is little incentive for the 
design team to keep cost low when such a method is used. Paul Grice, Clerk and Chief 
Executive of the Scottish Parliament told the public enquiry 'It is a fact of construction 
management - until you let the last tender,  and settled the last claim, you can't know 
the final amount' [PE 10 February 2004]. Robert Brown MSP, a member of the 
Scottish Parliament Corporate Body that was in charge of the project at one point 
aptly explains the source of the problems on the project. He noted, "the signature 
design, the contractual method, and the process of developing the design detail, I 
increasingly came to the view that most of our difficulties [experienced on the project] 
were in a sense inevitable once the button was pressed at the beginning by the Scottish 
Office when they let the contract in the first place."  
Strategic misrepresentation 
There was evidence of strategic misrepresentation, the deliberate distortion or 
misstatement of  the amount of time and resources necessary to achieve an aim, at 
many stages during the procurement of the project. Five weeks after their election 
1999, the new MSPs had to vote on whether or not to continue the project. At this 
stage, Alex Salmond MSP, leader of the main opposition party wrote to Sir David 
Steel MSP, the Presiding Officer of the Scottish Parliament, requesting that the project 
be suspended and that an estimate of possible cancellation cost be produced "in order 
to properly debate the future of the Holyrood project or other alternatives" 
(MS/1/083). He further wrote in a follow-up letter, "It is now possible that we may 
have to consider cancelling the Holyrood project; in the circumstances it is essential 
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that no further actions should be taken which would add to the cost of cancellation if 
this were the decision which Parliament reached." [MS/1/084] 
Faced with the dire prospect of possible project cancellation, civil servants in the 
Scottish Office, led by Barbara Doig, the Project Sponsor, decided to hide the fact that 
costs were going to be significantly higher than what the MSPs were to vote upon. In 
a classic example of strategic misrepresentation, the Project Sponsor did not include 
an extra £27million for risk in the estimates submitted to the MSPs. She later insisted 
that she was 'confident the £27million could be managed out' and therefore was not to 
be included in the information given to the members of the Scottish Parliament 
The proposed vote for an amendment urging a termination of the project was defeated 
by only three votes. Alex Salmond MSP, later told the public enquiry that the vote 
was based on false information, adding, "it is inconceivable that had the proper 
information been given to the members of the Scottish Parliament, that there wouldn't 
have been at least a delay for taking stock and reassessment... the figures, the facts, 
the timeline shows that when the Parliament were told they were inheriting a project 
of £109 million, it was actually well over £200 million and was totally out of control... 
Parliamentarians being misled and misinformed is a very serious issue indeed." [PE 
13 November 2003] 
Lord Fraser himself makes a strong case for strategic misrepresentation on the 
Holyrood Project by stating "As at the point of hand-over, where there is a very tight 
vote in the Parliament on whether to proceed with this particular project or not, that 
figure was specifically kept away from them. It looks rather as though, those who were 
involved in this were determined to keep the figure down as low as possible, even to 
the point of concealing it from the Parliament, in the hope that the project would go 
ahead."  
Political end-gaming and future-perfecting strategies 
There was a lot of evidence supporting political end-gaming and future-perfecting 
strategies in the early stages of the project as well. Donald Dewer and the project team 
seem to have capitalised on the newly found nationalistic sentiments and euphoria 
around the referendum. The project was continuously presented to the public as one 
that will represent the essence of Scottish devolution and be an "important symbol for 
Scotland" that will "pay tribute to the country’s past achievements and signal its 
future aspirations" (Scotland's Parliament 1997). Riding on these sentiments, Donald 
Dewer probably felt the need to build momentum and get the project started quickly. 
Consensus regarding some key decisions was ignored as he bypassed the consent of 
MSPs at many strategic stages, including the choosing of a site of the project [See 
MS/1/071 – 079]. It emerged during the public enquiry that he felt he had to 'endow' 
the MSPs with the new building and that if the decision of location of the building was 
not made quickly enough, the MSPs will never get around to doing it themselves. He 
probably also was aware that once the first concrete was poured, the project would 
become like a moving train that could not be stopped. 
Confirmation bias 
Confirmation bias, the tendency to seek or interpret information in ways that are 
partial to existing beliefs or expectations, played a key role in escalation on the 
Holyrood project. William Armstrong, an experienced project professional was the 
First Project Manager for the Holyrood Project at the Scottish Office. He resigned 
from his role because of frustrations he experienced regarding the spiralling cost and 
time delays. He was critical of the performance and commitment of the Architect, 
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Enrique Miralles writing to Project Sponsor, Barbara Doig, “There is no indication 
that Miralles [can] remedy the deficiencies in time, cost and design to meet the 
programme." [PE SE-4-044].  His resignation letter prophesied that if measures were 
not quickly taken to properly control and manage the project, the "programme will 
drift, the cost will increase, the design team will make claims, the contractors will 
make claims, and the project will become a disaster" [PE SE-4-044].  As indicated by 
Caldwell and O'Reilly (1982) and Kahneman (2011), confirmation bias leads a 
decision maker to underplay, and in some cases, even ignore disconfirming feedback 
on performance of any venture. William Armstrong's strong warnings were blatantly 
ignored by the project sponsor, who later stated that 'I was comfortable that a great 
deal was being done to ensure that we continue to be on program, that we got the cost 
sorted out and that we got the design to the quality required" [PE 4 December, 2003]. 
She decided instead that it was better that William Armstrong be removed from his 
post. He resigned before he could be fired. 
Political and organisational influences 
There were very strong political and organisational influences at many stages of the 
project as well. For example, opposition MSPs requested a two month delay in the 
project to examine the whole project more closely and explore other possible options. 
Margo MacDonald MSP insisted during a parliamentary debate that "too many 
questions are unanswered at this stage, and we plead with you [Donald Dewer] for 
the time to find adequate answers" [17 June 1999]. As is usually the case, those 
responsible for the negative outcome of a particular decision tend to maintain the 
norms of consistency in order not to appear indecisive or appear politically weak. 
Donald Dewer thus responded that such a delays requested by the opposition parties 
would "cost more than £3million in contract penalties". He added, "this Parliament 
would look like a laughing stock" if the opposition party got its way during the debate 
in Parliament. When it became apparent that the opposition might be fighting a lost 
cause, Donald Gorrie MSP said in reference to Donald Dewer, "it is a despotism, we 
have one man says what happens and we all obediently follow him" [17 June 1999)]. 
There were other sources of problems on the Holyrood project including significant 
scope changes, the death of the architect Enric Miralles, shortly followed by the death 
of project champion Donald Dewer. However, we have only concerned ourselves with 
some of the factors that may have contributed to escalation of commitment with its 
attending significant cost and time overruns.  
CONCLUSIONS 
The present study concerns the escalation of commitment to a particular course of 
action in decision making. We identified different enablers of escalation from the 
literature including sunk costs, self-justification, confirmation bias and strategic 
misrepresentation. We then examined official documentary evidence on the Holyrood 
project using a hindsight constructivist approach for possible causes of escalation that 
ultimately resulted in the cost and time overruns experienced on the project. We found 
overwhelming evidence in support of the use of strategic misrepresentation, self-
justification and reputation management during the project. The study also revealed 
evidence of optimism bias on the part of project sponsors in defining the budget and 
time constraints for the project.  
The case study suggests that escalation of commitment is a complex phenomenon with 
additive causes from different sources. We also highlight the importance of the early 
stages of a project, as decisions taken at this stage become increasingly difficult to 
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reverse. In general, it is important for project sponsors and decision makers to be 
aware of the fact that their decisions will tend to be biased by previous decisions, and 
that we all tend to have a natural inertia towards escalation of commitment, 
particularly after receiving negative feedback. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Knowing why and when escalation occurs can help managers avoid this common 
decision bias. However, as escalation may not always be readily obvious, it is 
important to put in place organisational structures that will help attenuate unwarranted 
escalation. The use of an objective outsider to evaluate our responses to disconfirming 
information, especially in situations of sequential decision making can be helpful in 
reducing escalation tendencies. It might be helpful to structure incentives so that 
decision makers are not punished for supposed inconsistency in order to curb the 
effect of self-justification. Increased monitoring, accountability, budget controls and 
scrutiny might also be helpful especially on large and complex projects.  
While this paper deals with the sources of escalation and how it might be curbed, it is 
important to mention that escalation should not necessarily be considered as a 
negative tendency. There are situations where it might be economically rational to 
escalate commitment to keep options open or maintain personal and future business 
relationships. On cursory examination, this might sound divergent to the core of the 
foregone discussions in this paper. However, what is proposed in this paper instead is 
that decision makers should be aware of the difficulty of separating initial decisions 
from related future decisions. It might be prudent to actively search for disconfirming 
information to provide a balanced perspective on confirming information that we are 
more likely to intuitively seek.  
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